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I use a strategic setup to investigate whether unipolarism can indeed persist
as a long run equilibrium. In a three-country world, a global power may
subsidise two satellites so as to incentivate them not to invest to build up a
coalition against it. I single out the conditions under which the one-shot game
is a Prisoners’ Dilemma where no subsidy is paid and the coalition arises at
equilibrium. Then, I revert to the inﬁnitely repeated game and apply the
Perfect Folk Theorem to characterise the critical thresholds of dicount factor
sustaining unipolarism at the subgame perfect equilibrium.1 Introduction
According to the realist theory, unipolarism is not bound to be a long run
equilibrium.1 Consequently, the current status quo w h e r et h eU Sa r et h eo n l y
existing global power seems at odds with the dominant view of the theory
of the balance of power, establishing that sooner or later a counterbalancing
power, perhaps taking the form of a coalition of several states, should arise.
In contrast with this position, Ikenberry (2002)2 proposes an eclectic al-
ternative view of the issue at stake, whereby the hegemony of the global power
is sustained by an international governance system granting every potential
competitor a number of appealing beneﬁts, e.g., bilateral trade agreements,
military support, etc.
This mixture of liberal and realist attitudes has two major implications.
On one side, it limits the power eﬀectively enjoyed by the US as the leader of
the international order; on the other, it clearly tends towards a reduction of
the incentives to look for alternatives (e.g., a counterbalancing coalition) by
means of a growing network of international institutions. This amounts to
saying that the system introduced by the US after the end of World War II
contains a tradeoﬀ between the amount of eﬀective hegemony exerted by the
global power and the degree of conﬁdence that the status quo might indeed
persist.3 That is, the insurance against defections is costly. This fact has
1To this regard, the existing literature is too wide to allow for an exhaustive listing.
See Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1979) and Gilpin (1981), inter alia.
2See also Ikenberry (1998-1999, 2001) and Keohane (1989). Horowitz (2001) points out
the relevance of appropriately accounting for risk-aversion, economic growth and political
rigidities in assessing the performance of the balance-of-power theory.
3Quoting Haass (1999, p. 37), “trading some American power for a more stable inter-
national system would be a good deal for America and the world”.
1prompted several doubts on the robustness of the existing system (see, e.g.,
Kupchan, 2002), as the sustainability of such costs on the part of the US
(and their tax payers) is not completely out of question.
The aim of the present paper is precisely to tackle this particular aspect
of the issue from a game-theoretic angle. I adopt a stripped down setup
modelling a three-country world where the players are a global power and
two satellites. To keep things as essential as possible, the strategy space is
binary, both for the global power and for each of the satellites. the hegemonic
country has to choose whether or not to subsidise the satellites, so as to avoid
the formation of a counterbalancing coalition, while the satellites have to
decide whether to ally or not, being aware that constructing a coalition is a
costly activity. To begin with, I investigate the one-shot game, then I analyse
as u p e r g a m eo v e ra ni n ﬁnite time horizon. The main results of my analysis
c a nb es u m m a r i s e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gt e r m s .F i r s t ,t h eo n e - s h o tg a m ep r o d u c e s
a unique Nash equilibrium which is also in dominant strategies, where the
global power does not distribute the subsidies and the best reply of the
satellites consists in building up a coalition. The ﬂavour of this conclusion
is clearly in line with the realist theory, whereby unipolarism should not be
sustainable as an equilibrium outcome. However, the second result paves the
route to a completely diﬀe r e n tv i e w ,i nt h a tt h e r ea l w a y se x i s t sa na d m i s s i b l e
region of the parameter space in which the one-shot game is a Prisoners’
Dilemma, i.e., the equilibrium involving the arising of a coalition is Pareto-
ineﬃcient. Accordingly, a further investigation through the toolkit of the
theory of repeated games appears appropriate. By doing so, I characterise
the stability properties that must hold in order for the supergame to admit a
subgame perfect equilibrium where the global power subsidies the satellites
2who, on their part, decide not to invest in order to build up the coalition. This
of course does not eliminate altogether the possibility of observing bipolarism
at equilibrium. Rather, it illustrates a reasonable scenario where the players
involved in the game may rationally select their strategies so as to keep the
status quo unchanged, eventually forever.
The structure of the paper is the following. The description of the setup
and the analysis of the one-shot game are in section 2. Section 3 describes
the repeated game. Concluding remarks are in section 4.
2T h e m o d e l
For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on a three-country world:4 one global
power (denoted by G) and two satellites, s1 and s2. Assume (i) G may pay
each of the satellites a given subsidy σ>0, lest they get together to form a
coalition aimed at diminishing G’s hegemonic position; and (ii) each satellite
may, if it does not receive the subsidy, invest an amount of resources k>0
to build up the coalition. It is relevant to stress that the alliance is taken
not to be a pure public good, in that an amount equal to 2k is needed for its
construction. To clarify this aspect, I introduce the following:
Assumption The overall cost of building up a coalition is 2k. The amount
of resources available to each satellite is k.
This prevents each small country si to undertake individually the venture
of building up a countervailing power to balance that of G. In turn, this
4A three-country world is also considered in some of the existing literature to analyse
several issues. For instance, Wagner (2004) uses it to investigate the relation between
bargaining and war.
3might open a discussion as to whether G c o u l ds a v eu p o nt h et o t a la m o u n t
of subsidies by granting only a single σ to one of the satellites, obtaining
in return that the coalition does not arise. Here I will not consider this
possibility, the reason being twofold. First, the distribution of subsidies to
both satellites is in accordance with facts, as observing the behaviour of the
US towards, say, Russia and China suﬃces to conﬁrm. Second, the model
is deﬁned in such a way that it includes only the relevant players, where
relevant means that they are the only potential competitors that G must
take into account. The rest of the world (say, Japan, EU, etc.) which is
known not to represent a threat to the global power in this respect, is not
modelled.
I am now in a position to introduce the basic elements of the game. The
global power faces four alternative perspectives:
1] If it delivers the subsidies and the satellites do not build up a coalition,5
G’s utility is:
UG(σ,NC)=cG − 2σ +2 βσ + P (1)
where:
• NC indicates that there exists no coalition;
• cG is G’s domestic consumption level;
• σ is the size of the subsidy, and therefore 2σ is the total cost borne by
G;
5The subsidy could, e.g., consist in a pure money transfer or in granting the satellites
free access into G’s domestic market, i.e., a free trade agreement. On the relationship
between security and trade, see Dorussen (1999) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001),
inter alia.
4• 2βσ measures the beneﬁt to the global power, generated by the subsi-
dies to the satellites, the marginal beneﬁt being measured by parameter
β ∈ (0,1). The relevance of β, on which I will come back later in the
analysis, can be preliminarily illustrated on the basis of tow alternative
perspectives. Keeping status quo unchanged through the distribution
of subsidies implies a cost and a return to G. The ﬁrst is obviously
represented by the total amount of subsidies, i.e., the quantity −2σ;
the second is a positive component measuring evaluation attached by
G to the fact that satellites do not ally against it, 2βσ. Hence, clearly
it must be β<1 for the for the subsidization manoeuvre to entail a net
cost, as common sense would suggest. As is going to become apparent
in the remainder of the paper, the size of β will play a crucial role in
shaping the equilibrium outcome.
• P measures the power level enjoyed by G if no coalition builds up.
UG(σ) > 0 for all σ ∈ (0,(cG + P)/[2(1 − β)]).
2] If instead the global power does not deliver any subsidies to the satellite
countries, and the latter form a coalition C,t h e nG’s payoﬀ is:
UG (0,C)=cG + P − βC (2)
where C ∈ (0,P) measures the level of power held by the alliance
between satellites s1 and s2. Note that the coalition reduces G’s power
to an extent measured by parameter β. This amounts to saying that G
evaluates in the same way the marginal disutility of any power decrease
as well as that associated to paying subsidies.6
6Note that the consumption level is not sensitive to the presence or absence of the
53] The third situation is that where G pays the subsidies but the satellites
decide to invest in a counterbalancing coalition, yielding thus:
UG(σ,C)=cG − 2σ + P − βC. (3)
4] T h el a s tp o s s i b l ec a s ei st h a tw h e r et h eg l o b a lp o w e rd o e sn o td i s t r i b u t e
the subsidies and, this notwithstanding, the satellites do not form an
alliance. In this situation, G’s utility is:
UG(0,NC)=cG + P. (4)
Now focus upon satellites. Again, four cases can be envisaged:
1’] If they accept the subsidies and do not create a coalition, each satellite
attains the following utility:
ui (σ,NC)=ci + σ (5)
where ci deﬁnes the domestic consumption level in satellite i.
2’] If instead, having received no subsidy, the satellite build a coalition, their
individual utility becomes:
ui (0,C)=ci − k + C. (6)
To this regard, it is worth stressing that country i pays an individual
fee k associated with the investment required to construct the alliance,
subsidy. This will hold for the satellites as well. This entails that here I choose to abstract
from any endogenous relationship between domestic welfare and international security,
which relates to the ‘guns or butter’ debate (see Polachek, 1980; Chan and Mintz, 1992;
Gowa, 1994; Powell, 1993; Heo, 1998; Skaperdas and Syropuolos, 2001; Carrubba and
Singh, 2004).
6but then enjoys the full beneﬁt C yielded by the alliance itself. One
has to assume that the net payoﬀ generated by the coalition is positive,
C ≥ 2k. This suﬃc e st oe n s u r et h a tui (0,C) > 0.
3’] In this case, each of the satellites is subsidised but still they decide to
form a coalition, whereby the individual payoﬀ accruing to each of them
is:
ui (σ,C)=ci + σ + C − k. (7)
4’] Finally, there remains the case where G does not distribute any subsidy
and the satellites do not invest to build an alliance:
ui (0,NC)=ci. (8)
The game can be represented in strategic form as in matrix 1, where G is
the row player. Given the additive separability of the payoﬀ functions, I will
only represent the payoﬀs of one of the two satellites as the column player,
without loss of generality and without aﬀecting the solution.7
si
NC C
GσcG − 2σ(1 − β)+P;ci + σ cG − 2σ + P − βC;ci + σ + C − k
0 cG + P;ci cG + P − βC;ci + C − k
Matrix 1
Assume the game is one of imperfect, complete and symmetric informa-
tion, and, for the moment, also assume it is one-shot. Now, in order to
7This is acceptable insofar as the alliance is not a public good, i.e., it takes two to
tango. The analysis of the game between satellites illustrating this feature of the model is
in the appendix.
7characterise the equilibrium solution, one has to examine the incentives, re-
spectively, for G to pay the subsidies so as to try and avoid the arising of the
coalition, and for the satellites to accept the subsidies and, possibly, not to
form the coalition. Observe that:
UG(σ,NC) <U G (0,NC) ⇔ β ∈ (0,1)
UG (σ,C) <U G(0,C) ⇔ σ>0
(9)
i.e., (i) if the satellites do not form a coalition, then it is convenient for the
global power not to pay the subsidies for all the admissible values of β, while
(ii) in presence of the coalition, it is optimal for G not to distribute any
subsidy for all σ>0. Therefore:
Lemma 1 The global power has a strictly dominant strategy, which consists
in not paying the subsidies to the satellites, for all admissible levels of pa-
rameters β and σ.
As to the satellite country i, the following holds:
ui (σ,C) >u i (σ,NC) ⇔ C>k
ui (0,C) >u i (0,NC) ⇔ C>k
(10)
which entails:
Lemma 2 Forming a coalition is a strictly dominant strategy for the satel-
lites.
On the basis of lemmata 1-2, without further proof, I may state:
Proposition 3 The one-shot game, where the global power must decide whether
or not to subsidise the satellites who simultaneously choose whether to build
8up a countervailing coalition or not, has a unique Nash equilibrium identiﬁed
by the strategy pair (0,C). Such a Nash equilibrium is in strictly dominant
strategies.
The next step consists in verifying whether the present game can be a
Prisoners’ Dilemma. For this to hold, the additional condition that has to
be satisﬁed is that the equilibrium be Pareto-ineﬃcient, which depends on
the relative magnitude of the payoﬀs appearing along the main diagonal of
matrix 1.
If the following inequalities are simultaneously satisﬁed, then the game is
indeed a Prisoners’ Dilemma:
UG(σ,NC) >U G (0,C) ⇔ cG − 2σ(1 − β)+P>c G + P − βC (11)
ui (σ,NC) >u i (0,C) ⇔ ci + σ>c i − k + C. (12)





while condition (12) yields:
σ>C− k. (14)
An intuitive interpretation can be given for both. On the one hand, (13)
shows that G will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deliver the subsidy if it is low enough
as compared to the ratio between the damage generated by the coalition,
given by βC,a n dt h en e tm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt of the subsidies measured by
2(1− β). On the other hand, condition (14) simply states that a satellite
will be willing to accept the subsidy and abandon the perspective of investing
to build up the coalition if the subsidy is higher than the net gain associated
with building up the coalition.




which is equivalent to the following condition:
2k(1 − β) >C(2 − 3β). (16)
Whether inequality (16) is met will of course depend on the relative size
of the three parameters involved. However, there clearly exist admissible
regions of the parameter space where this condition holds. The validity of
this assertion is quickly shown, as follows. By assumption, we know that
1−β>0. Therefore, the l.h.s. of (16) is positive. The r.h.s. may take either
sign, depending on the value of β: it is positive for all β ∈ (0,2/3), while it
is negative for all β ∈ (2/3,1). Therefore, taking any values of β in (2/3,1)
is suﬃcient (but not necessary) to validate (16).8 To complete the argument,
it suﬃces to observe that, if (16) holds, G may always choose an appropriate
value of σ such that the resulting game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Hence, I
have proved the following result:
Proposition 4 Examine the size of the subsidy. Two mutually exclusive
situations may arise:










the Nash equilibrium in dominant
8On the other hand, taking β ∈ (0,2/3) is necessary but by no means suﬃcient to ensure
the opposite result, i.e., that 2k(1 − β) <C(2 − 3β). To see this, consider that, provided
2 − 3β>0, this inequality is equivalent to C/(2k) > (1 − β)/(2 − 3β). Now, while we
know that C/(2k) > 1 surely, in order for the coalition to be viable, it is also true that
(1 − β)/(2 − 3β) < 1 for all β ∈ (0,1/2). Therefore, if β ∈ (1/2,2/3), (1 − β)/(2 − 3β) >
1 so that C/(2k) might be lower than (1 − β)/(2 − 3β) in this range.




or σ ∈ (0,C− k), the outcomes (σ,NC) and
(0,C) cannot be Pareto-ranked.










the Nash equilibrium in dominant







, the outcomes (σ,NC) and (0,C) cannot be
Pareto-ranked.
The second part of the above proposition describes the case where the
obvious solution is one where satellites do ally, the global power does not pay
any subsidies to try and keep the status quo unaltered, and ultimately there
are no regrets on either side. More interesting is the alternative perspective
where we observe a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, because in such a case, as is
well known, a repeated game framework may oﬀer a way out of the Pareto
ineﬃcient Nash equilibrium generated by the one-shot game. This is done in
the next section.
3T h e s u p e r g a m e
To model the behaviour of players in the supergame, I will resort here to the
so-called Perfect Folk Theorem based upon grim trigger strategies (Friedman,
1971).9
















, so that the constituent
game described by matrix 1 is indeed a Prisoners’ Dilemma. It is important
to stress that G may intentionally choose a level of σ in this interval, in order
to make the stage game a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The relevance of this aspect
lies in the fact that, by doing so, the global power may deliberately induce the
development of a supergame that may have an equilibrium outcome which
diﬀers completely from the one characterising the one-shot game. It is also
worth emphasising that only G is able to manipulate the strategic incentives
underlying the game, while satellites cannot do it. To some extent, this tells
that one of the prerogatives of the global power is precisely to aﬀect at will
the nature of the game, if this appears to be proﬁtable for her.
Let the stage game repeat over discrete time t ∈ [0,∞).10 Players share
the same discount factor δ ∈ [0,1]. The rules of the Perfect Folk Theorem
establish that players stick to the Pareto-eﬃc i e n tp a t ha sl o n ga sn od e v i a t i o n
is detected. As soon as this happens, then they revert to the dominant (Nash
equilibrium) strategy forever. Formally, players are instructed to adhere to
these prescriptions:
a] At t =0 ,Gplays σ and si,i=1 ,2, plays NC.
b] At any t ≥ 1, both keep playing according to rule [a], unless any deviation
has been detected at t−1, i nw h i c hc a s et h e yh a v et op l a yt h er e s p e c t i v e
dominant strategies yielding the Nash equilibrium of the one shot-game.
10It could be objected that governments do not last indeﬁnitely. However, the present
analysis is designed with the view that they may be suﬃciently forward looking to closely
mimic the behaviour of a single player living forever. Incidentally, this is in accordance
with observation, at least with respect to the issue at hand.
12The second part of rule [b] entails that, after any defection from the initial
(collusive) path, players revert to the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever.11
Therefore, the strategy pair (σ,NC) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
supergame if and only if, for both players, the discounted ﬂow of payoﬀs asso-
ciated to the collusive outcome (σ,NC) is at least as large as the discounted
ﬂow of payoﬀs associated to the alternative perspective where either player
d e f e c t so n c ea n dt h e nb o t hr e v e r tt ot h eo n e - s h o tn o n c o o p e r a t i v ee q u i l i b -
rium forever. That is, the outcome (σ,NC) is sustainable if and only if the























with δG,δ s ∈ (0,1) on the basis of conditions (13) and (14). A straightforward
examination of δG and δs reveals what follows:
Lemma 5 δG increases monotonically in σ, while the opposite holds for δs.
11Nash reversion has been criticised and improved upon in the game theory literature.
In games deﬁned in continuous strategies, one should use optimal punishments as the most
eﬃcient instrument to deter defections (see Abreu, 1986; and Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986,
inter alia). However, optimal punishments cannot be designed if players’ strategy space is
discrete.
13To prove Lemma 5, it suﬃces to observe that ∂δG/∂σ > 0 while ∂δs/∂σ <
0 always. The intuitive explanation of these facts is that, as σ becomes larger,
it becomes increasingly costly for G to pay the subsidies, while it becomes
more attractive to each of the satellites to accept the subsidies and renounce
to build the coalition.
Moreover:
δG − δs ∝ 2(1− β)σ
2 − β (C − k)C (21)
which is positive iﬀ
σ>
s
β (C − k)C
1(1− β)
. (22)
Comparing the expression in the r.h.s. of (22) with the lower and upper
bound of the interval for σ wherein we observe a Prisoners’ Dilemma, we
ﬁnd that s









provided that (16) is satisﬁed. This allows me to formulate the main result:
Theorem 6 Take 2k(1 − β) > max{0,C(2 − 3β)}, s ot h a tt h eg a m ei s
deﬁned by matrix 1 is a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Then, consider the inﬁnitely
repeated game whose constituent game is such a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Using
the Perfect Folk Theorem, the resulting critical thresholds of the discount
factors are:
1 >δ G >δ s > 0 for all σ ∈
Ãs















14If δ ≥ max{δG,δs}, then the strategy pair (σ,NC) is sustainable at the sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. For all δ ∈ [0,max{δG,δs}),
the subgame perfect equilibrium is (0,C).
It is worth observing that, for comparatively low levels of the subsidy,
the most demanding threshold is associated with the time preferences of
the global power; conversely, for suﬃciently high values of σ, the decisive
threshold is δs. A possible interpretation of this outcome could be that, if
σ is large enough, then the perspective of cheating becomes very appealing
for each of the satellites. By doing so each of them receives, if only for one
period, a very rewarding subsidy without bearing the cost of an alliance.
As a last remark, observe that the repeated game still allows for the Nash
equilibrium of the constituent game to repeat forever, that is, the above
Theorem illustrates, as is always the case with repeated games, the existence
of multiple equilibria, one of which is that yielded by the Prisoners’ Dilemma.
However, the point made by the present analysis is that the persistence of a
status quo characterised by unipolarism cannot be rationally ruled out.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
I have investigated a simple game-theoretical model examining the issue of
the stability of unipolarism. The foregoing analysis has highlighted that,
while the one-shot game has a clearcut solution prescribing the arising of
a countervailing coalition, the persistence of the status quo as a long run
equilibrium ultimately depends on the time preferences of the countries (or
their policy makers) involved in the repeated game. Therefore, on the basis
of the present modelization, the contradiction between the views expressed
15by the realist theory and observation seems to vanish, since a multiplicity
of equally plausible (or rationalisable) equilibria arises, depending upon how
much forward looking the players are in assessing their respective incentives
and consequently in selecting their optimal strategies. The analysis of the
repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma game has allowed me to single out speciﬁcc o n -
ditions under which the prediction of the model is in accordance with our
observation of the current state of the world.
16Appendix
Here I examine the strategic interaction between satellites, that have to
choose whether to undertake the construction of the coalition or not. To
do so, I take a fully noncooperative perspective. Two alternative games can
be envisaged, depending on whether the global power subsidises the satellites
or not. Matrix 2 describes the ﬁrst case.
s2
0 k
s1 0 c1 + σ;c2 + σ c1 + σ;c2 + σ − k
k c1 + σ − k;c2 + σ c1 + σ + C − k;c2 + σ + C − k
Matrix 2
Clearly, the game is symmetric along the main diagonal and there is no
dominant strategy, with
ci + σ>c i + σ − k;
ci + σ + C − k>c i + σ.
(a1)
Therefore, matrix 1 describes a coordination game with two symmetric equi-
libria, (0,0) and (k,k), which can be Pareto-ranked: (k,k) Â (0,0), as both
countries strictly prefer to ally. However, if the game is played under imper-
fect information, i.e., simultaneously, then there is no particular reason to
believe that the satellites will select (k,k).12 Completely diﬀerent considera-
tions can be put forward under perfect information, i.e., if the game is played
sequentially with either player at the root of the game tree. The extensive
form is in ﬁgure 1.
12Except, possibly, by invoking the focal point reﬁnement (Schelling, 1960).






































c2 + σ − k
c1 + σ + C − k
c2 + σ + C − k
c1 + σ − k
c2 + σ
It is easily checked by backward induction that the subgame perfect equi-
librium is (k,k). To see this, examine each subgame in isolation, starting
from the terminal nodes. If satellite j knows to be in the left singleton (be-
cause i has chosen strategy 0), then the optimal choice is to play 0. The
resulting payoﬀsa r eci + σ for both. Otherwise, in correspondence of the
right singleton, j’s best reply to k consists in choosing k, the associated pay-
oﬀsb e i n gci+σ+C−k. Hence, i i sa w a r et h a tc h o o s i n g0 it will attain c1+σ,
while choosing k it will attain c1 +σ +C −k>c i +σ. As a result, the opti-
m a lc h o i c ef o rt h ep l a y e rl o c a t e da tt h er o o to ft h eg a m et r e ei st oi n v e s tk,
inducing an analogous behaviour by the country located at the intermediate
nodes.
The alternative case where G does not pay any subsidies can be quickly
d e a l tw i t h ,a st h eg a m ei sq u a l i t a t i v e l ye q u i v a l e n te x c e p tf o rt h ea b s e n c eo f
18σ in all of the payoﬀs involved, as clariﬁed by matrix 3.
s2
0 k
s1 0 c1;c2 c1;c2 − k
k c1 − k;c2 c1 + C − k;c2 + C − k
Matrix 3
Therefore, under imperfect information we have again two Nash equilibria
in undominated strategies, (0,0) and (k,k), the latter being selected as the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction, if the game is
solved under perfect information.
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